UN Geneva - Multimedia Newsroom : UNIDIR Press conference on Cluster Munitions

Good morning and welcome to the global launch of the Cluster Munition Monitor 2025 report.

My name is Orsin Hoffman and I'm a senior researcher at the Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research unit here.

On behalf of UNIT here, it's an honour for me to chair this year's launch event for the Annual Class Termination Monitor report.

UNITAR is pleased to have enjoyed long standing and close collaboration with the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines and the Class Termination Coalition over the years.

This includes hosting numerous launches of the Annual Landmine Monitor and Class Termination Monitor reports of the respective campaigns.

Cluster munitions are weapons that are delivered from aircraft or fired in artillery, rockets, missiles and mortars.

They open in the air to disperse dozens and sometimes hundreds of submunitions over a wide area.

Their immediate impact can be devastating when used in populated areas.

Moreover, many seminations failed to to detonate as designed and pose a life threatening risk to civilians long after conflict have ended.

Besides its humanitarian impact, contamination from cluster munitions can also hinder sustainable peace and development efforts.

Adopted 17 years ago in May 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions is currently in good standing with 112 states parties.

While one country withdrew from the convention during the reporting period, another country acceded to it just this month.

UNIDIR reiterates the call of the UN Secretary General, Mr Antonio Guterres on the 4th of April 2025 when he called on countries that have not yet done so to join and fully implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Cluster Munition Monitor 2025 is the 16th annual report by the Cluster Munition Coalition.

It tracks the status of all countries in joining, implementing and otherwise upholding the norms of the Convention on Class Terminations.

The report is based on independent, impartial research.

This year, the Class Termination Coalition and UNIDIR will attend the 13th meeting of State Parties to the Convention on Class Terminations, which is held this year under the Presidency of the Philippines.

This meeting offers a timely opportunity to take note of positive developments, but it's also an opportunity to call attention to serious challenges, including recent use, production and transfer of class demonitions and their devastating impact on civilians.

As the Class Demonition Monitor shows, civilians indeed remain the primary victims of these weapons.

I will now hand over to three distinguished civil society experts who have been centrally involved in producing this year's Monitor report.

First, we have Michael Hart, who is part of the Monitors Ban Policy team.

He will present the report's findings relating to new use, production and transfer of cluster munitions as well as relating to progress in stockpile destruction.

Second is Catherine Atkins, editor for Mine Action and the trained DE mining expert.

Catherine will present highlights from the monitors reporting on cluster munition contamination and on clearance efforts to reduce the impact of these weapons.

And finally, on my very left, it's my pleasure to introduce Lauren Percy, the Impact Team Leader of the Landmine and Cluster Monition Monitor.

Lauren has edited the casualties and victim assistance section of every every Cluster Monition Monitor report since its inception in 2010.

Lauren will present the report's findings relating to the human impact of cluster monitions, including cluster monition casualties and victim assistance.

He will also report on how risk education can help reduce the impact of class demonitions.

In addition to the three panellists, I also recognise the presence here in the room of Thaber Gabalnick.

She's the director of the Geneva based International Campaign to Ban Land Mines and Class Demonition Coalition.

We also have Charles Peshara, Communications and Media Manager and the layout project manager for the monitor.

They also stand ready to answer your questions.

We will now hear from each presenter before I will then open the floor for your questions to them.

At this point, I would like to hand over to Michael you have the floor.

Thank you very much for introducing the report.

So to start with the ban policy findings from this year's cluster munition monitor, as mentioned, we have had one state party, a new state party recently joined Vanuatu, acceded to the treaty on the 5th of September.

And the Pacific region broadly has been the region which shows most promise in terms of new states parties.

Tonga and the Marshall Islands in the past year additionally have both said they're actively considering acceding to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The convention still has 10 signatories, most of these African states.

In the majority of those ten countries, the process towards ratification is stalled.

The Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda have said internal processes are ongoing towards ratifying the convention.

So there is some promise in the coming years that a couple more of the signatories will also join the convention.

And Vanuatu is the latest state party since South Sudan in 2024 and Nigeria in 2023 became members of the convention.

Earlier in the year, Lithuania was became the first state, unfortunately, to withdraw from the conventional cluster munitions until Lithuania's withdrawal and there had been no withdrawal of any state from this convention and four other humanitarian disarmament treaties that ban a single class of weapon.

Fortunately, there have been no more withdrawals from the conventional cluster munitions.

Lithuania's withdrawal was followed by four other states in North and Eastern Europe announcing their intention to withdraw from the Mine Ban treaty, Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Poland.

None of those four states are members of this convention, and there is no indication that any further state is considering withdrawal.

Lithuania, in terms of its reasoning, cited the altered security environment in Europe, in particular Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and indicated that it wanted to maintain the option to use what it described as, sorry, excuse my voice, the full spectrum of defensive weapons.

Of course, we would not classify cluster munitions as defensive weapons.

They are by their very nature indiscriminate weapons with long lasting effects.

After conflict has finished, the annual General Assembly resolution on the convention this year was adopted by 121 states, including 27 states not party to the convention, which as in previous years, does indicate that the norm against cluster munitions remains strong even among many states which are not members of the convention.

The numbers voting in favour was slightly down on previous years and this was due to an unusually high number of states not being in the room on the day of the vote.

Our preliminary preliminary voting indicated that similar numbers to previous year voted in favour and Russia, as in previous years, was the only country to vote against the General Assembly resolution in December 2024.

So on to use of cluster munitions in 2024 and 2025.

There have unfortunately been continued reports of new use of cluster munitions in Ukraine by both Russian and Ukrainian forces.

Russia's use has been extensive since the conflict began.

In fact, Russia's first use of cluster munitions was recorded in the initial days of the conflict in in February 2024, and they continue to be attacks impacting civilian areas and residential buildings.

Individual attacks recorded during the reporting period of killed dozens of civilians and left hundreds injured.

There's also been alleged use, according to Russia, by Ukraine, in Russian occupied areas of Ukraine and also in areas of Russia including Kursk.

However, these reports have not yet been independently verified.

The most extensive use in the conflict continues to be by Russia, with the Ukrainian authorities reporting more than 5900 separate cases of cluster munition use.

So that's the main area where cluster munitions are being used.

In terms of States parties, there have been no reports or allegations of use by states parties, not only in the reporting period, but since the convention was adopted in 2008.

So it really does demonstrate, in contrast to what we're seeing in some areas where cluster munitions are being used, the states parties are not using cluster munitions.

And in fact, there have been no prohibitions of these core areas of the convention since it came into being.

So it really does demonstrate its effectiveness as an instrument for those states that join in terms of preventing the humanitarian harm from these weapons.

New use was also recorded definitively in several other conflicts in the past year and eight months since the start of 2024.

Government forces in Myanmar have used a domestically produced cluster munition, an aerial delivered type of cluster bomb since around 2022.

In the ongoing civil conflict in the country.

Schools have been among the targets in rebel held areas in Qin state, Rakhine state, the Saigon region, KN state, among others where cluster munitions have been used during the reporting period.

In Syria, cluster munitions were used extensively by the Assad government, which was toppled obviously in early December.

And those reports of use in military operations alongside Russian forces in Syria continued, including during the final weeks of of the conflict that amid the uprising that led to the downfall of the Assad regime.

Cluster munitions were still being used in the North East of the country into November and early December.

Thailand's in July appeared to admit to using cluster munitions in a brief border conflict with Cambodia.

Initially, the type of cluster munition used was not identified.

We've since received further information indicating it's very highly likely that Thailand used DPICM submunitions in the conflict with Cambodia, and Thailand previously used cluster munitions in an earlier border conflict which took place from 2011 to 2013.

There were several other cases during the reporting period where there were reports or allegations that cluster munitions were used, which we've not been able to independently and conclusively verify.

Israel alleged that Iran used a ballistic missile containing cluster munitions earlier this year in June.

Authorities in Palestine have stated at the UN late last year that injuries have been reported very similar to those caused by cluster munitions in the conflict in Gaza.

But as far as we can see, there has been no conclusive evidence of any cluster munition use in that conflict.

Israel's last use of cluster munitions, as far as we have been able to decipher, was in the 2006 conflict with Lebanon.

In southern Lebanon itself last September, there were explosive submunitions, unexploded submunitions, I should say, reportedly found after Israeli strikes on on a Hezbollah ammunition storage depot.

And as far as we can see, these munitions were actually ejected from that storage facility during the strikes rather than munitions that were used in the conflict in recent weeks, which didn't make it into the report given that it was went to print in the final weeks of August.

There's since been reports of use by Israel, So sorry, reports of use from Israel by Houthi rebels in Yemen in rocket and missile attacks targeting Israel.

Again, there's been some imagery emerged, but we've not been able to verify those reports at this stage.

In terms of production and transfer, there are four countries which we were able to conclusively evidence production of cluster munitions in 2024 and 2025.

These were around which is producing cluster munitions for its ballistic missiles.

Myanmar, which continued its domestic production of what is quite a rudimentary cluster munition.

South Korea confirms that one company continued to produce cluster munitions in 2024 but did not provide further information on the types produced.

In May this year, evidence of North Korean production of cluster munitions emerged for the first time when unexploded submunitions were found in Ukraine, with Korean language markings indicating production in North Korea.

However, it's not known if these were used by North Korean forces participating in the conflict alongside Russia, or whether these cluster munitions were transferred to Russia and used by Russian forces in Ukraine.

In terms of transfer, the US made at least 7 transfers of cluster munitions to Ukraine during the Biden administration from July 2023 to October 2024, and they've been no further reported US transfers since then and no further transfers under the Trump administration.

They've also been reports that Ukraine may have acquired cluster munitions from other countries during the course of the conflict.

Since 2022, these countries have issued denials that any transfers have been made.

Stockpile destruction is an area where the treaty stands in very good steps.

42 states parties once possessed 1.5 million cluster munitions collectively and almost 180 million sub munitions.

And all of those 42 states have now completed destruction of their stocks.

So this is an area where the treaty is holding up very well.

And again, it demonstrates the effectiveness of the treaty that all of the states with stockpiles have now destroyed them, Peru being the last country to destroy its stockpiles in 2023.

There are however, a large, quite a large number of countries, around 50 thought to still stockpile cluster munitions.

All of these are outside the Convention.

6 states retain cluster munitions, live cluster munitions for research and training purposes as permitted under the convention, and Germany retains the highest number of those.

And I think I can now pass on to Catherine, who's going to speak about contamination.

Thank you very much, Michael.

As of the end of December 2024, we counted 29 states areas that are known or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

This includes state, 10 states parties which you see listed on the slide whereby Lao PDR remains massively contaminated, Iraq remains having a large contamination.

Worthwhile mentioning is as well that states not party, Vietnam and Cambodia both as well remain massively and largely contaminated respectively.

We added one state to the list of contaminated countries, which is Myanmar.

It seems obvious that we would do that because we know of the use of cluster monitions, but sometimes the evidence for effective contamination on the ground comes a bit later.

First, remnants have to be found.

Survey has to be done to really say whether there is a contamination on the soil or not.

But we have enough evidence now that we could unfortunately had to add Myanmar to the list of contaminated countries.

Most state parties, except charred in Somalia also gained a better understanding of their contamination.

This means they conducted survey, They have adjusted the extent of contamination.

Sometimes figures went up not because there is new contamination, but because it was not clearly known before and new areas have been surveyed.

Sometimes the figures could be lowered because a better understanding is there of the exact boundaries of contamination.

And another point worthwhile highlighting is as well that as Michael already said, we have evidence of new contamination in Syria and in Ukraine based on the new use of cluster monition.

And also as Michael said, we do have evidence that the kicked out cluster monition in Lebanon from this attacked Hezbollah ammunition stores, they cause contamination as well, which is now being surveyed and and cleared.

11 state parties so far have completed clearance of cluster munition contaminated land between 2008 and 2024.

The most recent one was Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2023.

So unfortunately despite having five state parties which only have a small or very small extent of cluster contamination left, no state party complete the clearance in 2024.

Next slide please Talking about clearance or land release.

So we had eight state parties, again a chart and some Somalia are not amongst the state parties who released land.

The eight other state parties released over 100 square kilometre of land and destroyed over 80,000 submunitions in 2024.

This is good news.

It's more land released than in 2023, be it through non-technical survey, through technical survey or through clearance.

And it's the highest number of submunitions destroyed in the past five years.

Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and South Sudan unfortunately released less land than in 2024, predominantly due to funding issues.

So degreased funding in Lebanon as well, just because the answer has divided, has been divided to emergency responses and resources have been taken away from legacy clearance tasks.

The good news, Chile, Germany, Lao PDR and Mauritania all released more land.

And as I already mentioned, unfortunately Charles and Somalia did not release any class termination contaminated land in 2024 and also not in the previous year.

Also unfortunately, South Sudan is the only state party which is still working towards its initial clearance deadline of 2034.

So South Sudan only joined the convention, hence has still a long time to go to get the clearance done.

All Order 9 contaminated state parties have already requested one or more extension requests to their clearance deadline.

So requesting extension has pretty much almost become a normality rather than an exception.

Unfortunately, in 2025, we had five state parties that requested an extension request.

Afghanistan for the second time, Chile already for the 4th time.

Lebanon also submitted the second request, Mauritania the third request and Somalia the first one.

And with that, I hand over to Lauren.

[Other language spoken]

I'm going to speak about the situation of casualties from classmations and classmation remnants.

The cluster mission Monitor records the casualties each year and has done so since entry and force of the convention in 2010.

But the data also looks back to the 1960s.

And so when we have a look at the situation in the last calendar year which we collect the data 2024, we could see that Ukraine continued to have the highest number of casualties in the world.

And cumulatively since the full Russian invasion of February 2022, Ukraine has had recorded over 1200 casualties of classmations.

We recorded 314 classmation casualties in 2024.

Now this, given the evidence of all past years when there have been high levels of conflict, is the tip of the iceberg.

And what we have seen previously in the case of conflicts in Syria and Yemen around 2011, two, 1012, there was high numbers of classmation casualties, but this only came out later in 2015, two, 1016.

And even Lao PDR, which Catherine mentioned is the most contaminated country from class nations.

It's also a states party to the convention.

But it took decades before the number of casualties was not just an estimate, but was actually measured through survey to number in the many thousands, which we knew to be true.

But what is very clear is that civilians continue to bear the brunt of this indiscriminate weapon.

Consistently, the number of civilian casualties has been over 90% in all the years that we've measured that.

And consistently children have suffered from the impact of cluster mission remnants which they often find interesting think a toys or come across in play or on their way to school or when working in fields and similar sort of day-to-day activities that children go about and do.

So almost half, that's 42% of cluster mission remnants casualties in 2024 were children.

So as Michael mentioned, there were class submission attacks in Myanmar, Syria and Ukraine, and there was casualties from all of those attacks, most of them in Ukraine.

There were casualties from the remnants of class submissions, the volatile unexploded submissions in apart from the countries where there was attacks in mostly states parties, including those which have requested an extension to clear the contamination as Katrina had mentioned.

And so those countries which were parties and bound to the obligations of the convention include Afghanistan, Iraq, Loud Pedia, Lebanon and Mauritania and also Lebanon as well as those countries that had that had conflict.

I'll just move on to talk about the mitigation of next slide please.

Mitigation of the risks from class nations and all countries which are bound by the obligations of the Convention, which where civilians are at risk of classmation contamination, did actually implement measures to address that risk through risk education.

And that really very much targeted those who are most at risk.

Like I said, children who are very much affected, but men and boys in particular.

Men because of working and interacting with classmation remnants in fields in the workplace and boys as I said, because of those activities that children are often engaged in.

And the targeting of that was really continued to be spot on.

And actually looking at those who are most at risk and in the areas where communities are most likely to be interacting with the contamination.

So children being 60% of beneficiaries, it makes sense in this context.

But there was some developments which were new, including digital means for reaching people in conflict and also in remote areas and messages which specifically address at risk groups and then people who are going to undertake activities that could bring them into risk.

And there was also because of the effects of conflict and the especially where class missions were used.

So that is in states which have not party to the convention measures to more warn people about how to have safe behaviours during conflict bombing and shelling which might include classmissions and other musions was also combined with risk education messages.

I'll just move to victim assistance finally.

So victim assistance is a vital obligation of this convention and it serves to address the needs of classmation victims, but also other people with specific needs which overlap with classmation victims in those countries.

But most of the countries with classmation victims.

A party to the convention faced serious challenges in providing assistance to classmation victims, especially the survivors.

Access to emergency medical care often remained limited and countries where there had been a crisis in economic, political or security, such as Afghanistan, Chad, Lebanon and Somalia tended to have less available in terms of victim assistance.

South Sudan has had continuously a lack of assistance for survivors, which has been devastating to the extent that some survivors of clasmissions expose remnants of war and mines have have really sought drastic measures and have have suffered a lot.

And South Sudan coming onto the treaty quite recently is reporting on its efforts in that regard.

So although these areas which are lacking, including psychological support and economic inclusion, there has been a lot done by the countries and NGOs to try and address that problem.

And it's just unfortunate that in the past year turns in the economic situation of development funding have really worsened that situation, especially in layer PDR, I could say.

But I'm happy to take questions on that.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you very much to all the the panellists for their insightful presentations.

It's now my pleasure to open the floor for your questions here in the room.

But also obviously for those joining online, kindly raise your hand when when taking taking the OR when I give you the floor.

Maybe you could also introduce yourself briefly your affiliation so that we know where the the question is also coming from.

So with that, the, the floor is now open and I I recognise 2 hands.

So first of all, the the lady in in the middle row and then I already note you down for your question, please your question.

Yeah, thanks very much.

[Other language spoken]

One question in the report, you mentioned that Germany continues to be a transit country for the cluster munition going from from the US to Ukraine.

Now, you mentioned that you don't have evidence for any deliveries since the Trump administration took over.

Could you just clarify, do you know if Germany continues to be a transit country?

And if so, what do you expect from the German government in reaction to this?

[Other language spoken]

Thank you very much for this question.

Maybe I take a second one and then we we can hand over to to the panellists.

The floor is yours again, please.

[Other language spoken]

I just was interested to to know what kind of trend you foresee in kind of going forward given that these conditions are continued to be used in Russia and Ukraine, but also we had reports there in Thailand as well and some other venues have got conflict.

I'm aware that the number of conflicts in the world is high and continues to grow at the moment.

So what kind of concerns and trend are you seeing particularly in this era of conflict and increasing defence spending and particularly concern in Eastern Europe with the war in Ukraine?

And secondly, a question for for Lauren, I think interested about the impact of aid cuts, development cuts on Victim Support and why is that concerning and where have you started to see that impact?

[Other language spoken]

Thank you very much.

Before taking all the questions, maybe we could reply to those two or several questions which were, which were raised.

Maybe I give the floor to you first, Michael.

And there was a question on, on Germany as the transit country, but also the trends in yeah, in, in, in other contexts.

And then maybe a Lauren as well regarding the funding cuts and, and, and maybe capturing you then also have something to add there over to Michael.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you very much for your questions.

On Germany, there was at least one instance, according to a German media investigation, where cluster munitions stored by the US and an ammunition storage facility it has in Germany were transferred across German and Polish territory to Ukraine.

Since that instance, as far as we're aware, there is not continued transit of cluster munitions across German territory.

The details about it is not as extensive as we'd like and we'd like Germany to make a statement to clarify its stance on this situation.

In terms of the second question on trends on use of cluster munitions, it is a very concerning time in terms of use, with Interstate conflict becoming a feature of the kind of global security environment in recent years, which it hadn't been for quite a long time before.

However, in terms of the estates parties, the convention is holding up extremely well and there still remains A norm against use of cluster munitions in the vast majority of states not party as well.

So for example, since the convention came into being in 2010, there's only been 10 countries which have used cluster munitions over that 15 year period of time.

All of those estates not party to the convention.

I think you mentioned specifically Eastern and Northern Europe.

Obviously this is an area of concern given that several countries have pulled out of the landmine ban treaty.

In terms of cluster munitions, though, the Convention seems to be holding up very well.

There's no indications that any other country in that region is looking to withdraw.

And again, we'd re emphasise that this is because these weapons are indiscriminate.

They have long lasting effects that any assumed military utility to these weapons is far outweighed by the humanitarian consequences which many countries, which are states party and states not party, mentioned in their statements every year at these meetings.

So I think the convention is holding up well, but obviously we are very concerned about use in active conflicts and we're hoping this use will reduce and stop and that more countries will join the convention.

Personally, I can see a scenario where there is more momentum behind the convention in several years time once various conflicts are resolved because it's been very clearly demonstrated as an evidence in these conflicts that cluster munitions have very little military utility.

Thanks for the question about funding.

Yes, it's been really a devastating year, I could say with regard to resources for addressing the impact of class missions and other remnants of war and landmines.

I'll speak about the situation with victim assistance and data and and I'm sure catering could give more insights into the aspects that have affected clearance because it's a little bit different, particularly because the funding sources are a bit different.

So when it comes to victim assistance, because it's often through a kind of holistic approach which also addresses either other persons with disabilities or other conflict affected people.

There were significant amounts of funding through USAID for victim assistance, sometimes whole programmes including including a multi year programme in Lao PDR that had gone for decades.

That was essential in providing both first aid in remote areas where there are classmation victims, which was clearly there to address the legacy of the bombings of the the 60s and 70s, but also the entire rehabilitation programme including prosthetics and rehabilitation.

And that was cut and as far as we know not re established in any way.

Afghanistan, which had already since the Taliban takeover of the country had suffered from a real deficit of funding for for the the basics of implementing victim assistance also suffered more from those cuts.

But then we saw for example, with some of the international agencies which collect data, they had their funding cut and then some of that funding was either returned through other channels from the US or other states stepped in.

So it, the situation is mixed, but it's my sense that that victims fared very badly from it in many countries.

[Other language spoken]

Funding cuts or, or let's say the, the political development of the world reflected in contamination and, and land releases is quite complex.

I mean, we, we certainly see or we, we see a trend of, you know, more new contamination.

We also see a trend of sometimes increased contamination, but simply because we have today better methods to actually find it and, and map it.

But what we also expect is, or what we see is that land release slows down, particularly in countries which previously made good progress, which is Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon.

All three were countries we'd had which had a good funding source, consistent funding.

But we see now that even these countries really struggle with funding, hence less resources to get the clearance done, hence they slow down.

And as I said, that's also why Afghanistan and Lebanon have requested an extension.

We have all the countries such as Somalia and Chart, but also Mauritania, which really struggled because there never was a real donor interest and there is also another donor interest now.

So in in very short, the trend is unfortunately rather increased contamination and degrees of land release.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you very much for these questions and and answers.

I would like to reopen the floor for questions and I recognise to questions online.

I would like to give the floor first to Miss Larson followed to be followed by Miss Sotomayor.

Yes, thank you very much for your for the briefing and for taking my question.

This is Nina Larson with AFP.

I was hope, I was wondering if it would be possible to break down the casualty figures that you're giving in deaths and injuries to know how many people you you know of that have died from cluster cluster munitions.

And then also you say that this is a fairly dramatic underestimate likely.

Do you could you quantify sort of from what you've looked at how many casualties you think they're, they're probably were last year, I mean, compared to the the fairly low number you think the official number?

And finally, just on, on the question of the transfers to Ukraine that have stopped since, since the Trump came to power.

I was wondering if you have any indication that the US has transferred cluster munitions to other countries or if they're planning on transferring continuing transfers to Ukraine, although they have stopped for now.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you very much.

Maybe we take the question from Sotomayor at the same time.

I'm happy to give you the floor.

Thank you very much, Gabriela.

Sotomayor Mexico Proceso My question is just to I didn't get the, the number of children that you're mentioning that they are the children are the victims the the the majority of the victims.

[Other language spoken]

So if you can clarify that and how many and where, where did they did they, were they these casualties?

And then if you have anything to say about non state parties, for example Mexico, I heard that cartels maybe are using cluster bombs.

I don't know if this is true or if it's not, is there a way to to, to find it?

Because I heard that the cartels are using or maybe the, the, the, the army against cartels.

That's that's the thing that I would like to, to know.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you very much for these two questions.

Maybe we hand over to the panellists to to respond to them.

So there were few questions related to to casualties, the breakdown, but also the the the question of on report on the reporting, if I understood correctly.

And then the question of children.

So maybe a lower in a bunch of questions for for you and then maybe Mike as well.

Then on on the transfers under the order.

Yeah, the question about transfer under the trans Trump administration and on state actors, yeah, sorry, unfortunately I don't have the breakdown right in front of me.

I just need to to dig it out, but I will find it.

But in general, the number of people killed compared to injuries is about 30%.

And that is that is that is consistent always.

Regarding the percentage of child casualties, that 42% is the percentage of class ammunition remnants casualties.

[Other language spoken]

I we'll just find the exact figures.

And regarding the estimate now, we don't make an actual estimate of the number of casualties missed.

It has been done in the past through extrapolations and it's really difficult to pin a figure and then try and stick to it once survey has happened.

But as I mentioned in the case of Lao PDR, the survey that was done in about 2000 and eight, 2009 came up with actually a very similar figure of classmation casualties to the extrapolation, which was about 8000.

But if you look at the case of Ukraine and the amount of classmation use that Michael mentioned thousands of attacks.

And if you look at the data sources which are missing the actual casualties being reported during attacks, we we have just 10s of attacks where the attack has been recorded.

There's a location, we know what type of class information was used, but the casualties were with it weren't reported.

So just given that without making an estimate, it would seem that those numbers would have to be in the hundreds.

In addition, both sides claim military casualties but in unverifiable ways such as estimates.

So we don't include estimates in the casualty figures, but but definitely all indications are that as in other conflicts there would be hundreds of casualties, more at least if not thousands.

[Other language spoken]

Thanks very much.

I can answer the question on, I think you asked a question on US transfers of cluster munitions.

So in terms of its transfers to Ukraine, it has transferred ATACM long range missiles and DPICM submunitions.

That's what we know of the last two of its seven transfers to Ukraine.

It was not specified in terms of the type of cluster munitions transferred.

In terms of US transfers to other countries, the US has transferred and exported cluster munitions in the past.

For example, Israel is among the countries that hold U.S.

[Other language spoken]

the US Defence Security Corporation Agency, which licences transfers, has had a policy in place since 2000 and since 2009 that it does not transfer close to munitions, which it judges to have more than a 1% failure rate.

So it does have that restriction in place.

However, these munitions in testing often have a much lower failure rate than they have in the field.

So it's anywhere as high as 14% in terms of munitions actually in use during conflict.

So any any transfer or export of cluster munitions is still a concern.

I think there was also a question, was it on non state armed group use of cluster munitions?

OK, I'm not aware of the Mexico question.

I would have to get back to you with some information.

Once we've looked into it, in terms of use by non state armed groups during the reporting period, obviously the Houthis in Yemen have been alleged to use cluster munitions.

Those reports are currently unverified.

We are looking into it and it will be reflected in future reports and online updates.

In terms of past use, the Islamic State used cluster munitions in Syria around 20/14/2015.

Hezbollah was used cluster munitions in the past and cluster munitions were also used by various actors in the 1990s during the conflicts that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia.

But the specific question of Mexico, I would have to get back to you don't have any information on it.

Thank you for these responses.

There is still a bit of time if there is any additional question and maybe question to Miss Sotomayor, whether your hand is still is a new question or is it still from from the previous questions you had.

In case you have a new question, please feel free to ask your question.

[Other language spoken]

You know, I don't know by memory all the state parties, but is Russia part of the of the convention?

And yeah, if they use the cluster bombs.

Thank you for the question.

So both Russia and Ukraine are not party to the convention and none of the states which have used cluster munitions in the reporting period or since the convention have come into force.

None of them are states parties at all.

So all use occurs by states outside the convention.

Thank you for this clarification.

I don't see any more question online, but if you have another question, then please take the opportunity to to raise your hand the same as well in the room.

That will be the last call in case you have a question.

But I this does not seem to be the case in that case.

Before closing this global launch on on behalf of UNIDIR, I would like to congratulate the authors on their report, which once more will be instrumental for the discussions on on cluster munition, including during this week's meeting of state parties to the conventional cluster munitions.

Thank you as well to all the panellists for their insightful presentations.

And finally as well, Many thanks to the audience in the room and and online for your interest, attendance and for your questions.

I wish you a good day and the meeting is now closed.

[Other language spoken]

UNIDIR Press conference on Cluster Munitions - 15 September 2025