UN Geneva - Multimedia Newsroom : HRC Press conference: FFM on Venezuela

[Other language spoken]

I thank you all very much for joining us today for this press conference with the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on Venezuela.

Joining us today are all three members of the Commission in the centre of the Chair, Marta Valenius.

To my right is Francisco Cox, Viau and on the far right is Patricia Tabata.

The Mission will be sharing with you the findings of their latest report which is on the Missions website or will be shortly, along with two more reports known as Conference Room papers that contain more detailed findings.

A press release on today's report has been sent out and should be with you in your inboxes.

The Mission will be presenting this report to the Human Rights Council at the start of next week on Monday 25th of September, which will be followed by an interactive dialogue.

As you may know, the Fact Finding Mission was created in 2019 by the Human Rights Council.

It has a mandate to investigate gross violations of human rights, including extradition, executions and forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, including those involving sexual and gender based violence committed since 2014 and to help combat impunity and ensure accountability for perpetrators, justice and justice for victims.

So now Miss Velinas will make an opening statement, followed by remarks from the fellow experts, and then, as usual, open the floor to your questions.

Now, without further ado, I give the floor to Marta.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you, Todd, and I'd like to thank all the journalists in Geneva and worldwide for attending this media conference online or in person.

The Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was established in 2019 and is today releasing its fourth report.

We are focusing on several aspects of the country's human rights crisis.

On the one hand, our report focuses on the different repressive mechanisms employed by the state apparatus against persons who are critical of the government and the impact of repression on the civic and democratic space in the country.

On the other hand, we have expanded our investigations into state structures involved in the Commission of human rights violations.

The mission based its findings on 256 confidential interviews and focus groups discussions involving a total of 299 individuals, 153 men, 140 two women and four persons of diverse gender identities.

Due to a continued lack of access to Venezuelan territory, these interviews were conducted remotely using security protocols.

I will begin by addressing the first topic in our report.

In our first report, published in 2020, we identified that the state authorities were responsible for gross human rights violations and international crimes as part of a policy to repress dissent against the government of President Maduro.

We documented numerous instances of arbitrated privations of life, particularly in the context of peak periods of protests in 2014, two, 1017 and 2019, as well as mass arbitrary detentions followed by torture and I'll treatment, sexual and gender based violence, and also short term enforced disappearances.

In our first report, we concluded that many of these acts were crimes against humanity.

The report that we have now prepared for the Human Rights Council provides an overview of how these human rights violations and international crimes have evolved since our first report.

For this reason, the present report focuses on the period from 1st of January 2020 to 31st of August 2023.

For the purposes of this update, we investigated 43 new cases involving the human rights violations and crimes explicitly listed in our mandate.

These cases concerned 72 individual victims, of whom 47 were men, 25 were women, including one transgender woman.

We've only investigated these violations and crimes where they were clearly linked to the state's policy of targeting real or perceived opponents to the Maduro government.

We concluded that at least 58 individuals were arbitrarily detained in Venezuela in the period from 2020 to the present.

In these cases include the arbitrary detention of trade union leaders, human rights defenders, NGO members, journalists, members of opposition parties and others who expressed criticism or complaints against the government, including labour demands.

We also found that at least 14 individuals were subjected to short term enforces, appearances attributable to state authorities.

The victims remained missing for periods between several hours to several days and up to 10 days until the authorities eventually disclosed their whereabouts, having first denied such information to their relatives or lawyers.

In addition, we documented 28 cases of torture and I'll treatment against individuals who opposed the government or are perceived as such while they were being held in detention, both in official and clandestine places of detention.

Sexual and gender based violence continue to be used as a form of torture and humiliation through ****, the ****** of ****, as well as through invasive searches and forced nudity against detainees and even against their family members and lawyers when they visit them in prison.

Overall, we received fewer allegations of the human rights violations and crimes explicitly listed in our mandates as compared to those documented in previous reports.

But we wish to emphasise that the numbers recorded in this year's report must be viewed in light of a shift in the political and human rights crisis in Venezuela that took that took place in late 2020 and early 2021.

The year 2020, with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, marked the end of massive protests called for by opposition parties, also a reduction in the practise of massive arrests of demonstrators followed by torturing detention and also the end of large scale counter insurgency operations deployed by state forces in response to initiatives to overthrow or destabilise the government.

Our conclusion is that serious human rights violations are being committed to this day in Venezuela and that these violations are not isolated acts but continue to reflect a policy to suppress dissent and opposition to the government.

The Mission as Reasonable grants believe that state security forces such as the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, the National Bolivarian Police have continued to be responsible for the violations that I have just described.

This year, in addition to the hardline tactics of repression that Miss Valenius referred to, we decided to extend the scope of our investigations to look at other coercive methods to control, silence and repress criticism or even questioning of the government, the so-called softer methods of repression.

For this purpose, we documented numerous cases of targeted repression of union leaders, journalists, human rights defenders, politicians and their family members, as well as repression of key civil society institutions, political parties and the media.

The cases involved 51 individual victims.

We also investigate 42 instances of attacks and restrictions against civil society organisation and political parties.

Our investigation have shown that civil society leaders and journalists have been targeted through surveillance and threats, as well as defamatory campaigns by **** level government officials.

Arbitrary criminal proceedings have been used to make examples of outspoken critics, charging them with crime such as hate speech or terrorist, simply for organising peaceful demonstration or protests publicly questioning members of the government.

State institutions have banned candidates from opposition parties from running for public office.

We found that due to state controls, there is almost no independent print media in the country.

The government also censors content published on television, radio and web pages.

Media outlets who disregard censorship face arbitrary closures which has led to increasing self censorship.

The coverage of topic regarding human rights violation or anti government demonstration is banned.

It is expected that, as in the past, the coverage of this press conference will be probably censored by the authorities.

The government also uses laws and regulation to limit the operations of NGOs, labour unions and political parties, imposing state selected boards of directors on these on these organisations to control their activities.

Despite Venezuela's historical advocacy for women's rights, activists and organisation working in the field of sexual and reproductive rights are facing intensified harassment, often from government factions influenced by ultra conservative religious groups.

By criminal, excuse me, by criminal citing participation in legitimate activities, the government is silencing and creating a chilling effect on anyone who might consider participating in any activities that could be perceived as critical of the government.

In addition, the lack of independence and the deliberate action of judicial and constitutional institution, including the Comptroller General, the Ombudsman Office and the National Electoral Council contribute to curtailing the civic and democratic space.

We are witnessing signs that the selective repression against social and political leaders is intensifying in light of the forthcoming presidential election scheduled for 2024.

The recent political disqualification of opposition presidential nominee Maria Corina Machado, the judicial intervention by the Supreme Court of the Communist Party of Venezuela, or the criminal conviction of 6 prominent trade union leaders are worrying signs in this regard.

[Other language spoken]

One of the trademarks of this fact finding mission on Venezuela's investigation is our focus on state structures involved in human rights violations.

This focus is key in pursuing accountability for past atrocities and justice to victims and contributing to the prevention of future human rights violations and crimes.

This year we have focused our investigation on a new police structure created in July 2022, the Directorate for Strategic and Tactical Action Diet for its Spanish acronism.

Specifically, we looked at the allegations that the new directorate is simply a reproduction of the previous Special Action Forces Phi's for its Spanish acronism.

This is an area of particular concern for the mission.

According to our first report, the Special Action Forces ranked among the most lethal police force in Venezuela, notably through their involvement in security operations aimed at combating criminality.

We concluded that the fires were involved in extrajudicial killings, including crimes against humanity.

The mission also documented their involvement in arbitrary detention of real or perceived opponents of the government who were subsequently handed over to and tortured by the State Intelligence services.

The Special Action Forces were supposedly this band in mid 2022 and the new structure, the Directorate for Strategic and Tactical Actions or Diet was established formally in July 2022.

Through our investigations, we have obtained testimonies and documents from forces sources with inside knowledge of the structure, organisation, modus operandi and chain of command of this Directorate, which we have corroborated corroborated with other information from official and open sources.

This allows us to conclude that the Diet is the de facto continuation of the FIAS.

Indeed, in terms of its structure and organisation, the Diet has absorbed personnel and police units that were part of the FIAS.

Regarding its modus operandi, we analysed the role of the Diets intervention in the so-called Thunder security operations or Operacion Estreno between April and September 2022.

According to open sources, these operations resulted in 72 killings and 345 arrests.

The Diet participated in five out of seven of these operations, replicating actions and strategies from files used in previous security operations.

For example, it was reported that security agents carried out raids without warrant and performed arbitrary detentions, that they killed people on the basis that they had criminal records, and that in some cases the victims did not confront security forces before they were directly executed.

In relation to the chain of command, we found that out of the 15 command and middle management positions in Diet, 10 have been held by former ****-ranking officials.

Of the now extinct files, some of them were identified in our previous reports as responsible for international crimes, including the Director of Diet, the former director and the head of the Criminal Investigation Division.

Our investigations have led us to conclude that security agencies involved as human right in serious human rights violations and crimes against humanity continue to exist in Venezuela, only to have the names of the agency changed.

Meanwhile, the government can decorate, promotes and entrust new command responsibilities to those who should be prosecuted and sanctioned.

Allow me to conclude some final reflections.

Our investigations have built up a picture of the hard line and softer tactics of repressions deployed in Venezuela against real or perceived opponents of the government.

These are two components of an oppressive state apparatus that has been used as at varying degrees depending on the nature and perceived influence of social dissident dissent.

But the important point is that the state continues to have the capacity to resort to hardline to the hardline tactics and then they can activate or deactivate this method at will.

What we are witnessing now is an accumulated impact of these tactics of repression, which has a result in a prevalent culture of fear, mistrust and self censorship.

As a consequence, the fundamental elements of civic and democratic space have been severely curtailed in Venezuela.

Thank you very much.

Thank you everyone for those opening remarks.

So today's press conference will be will be taking place in English only.

However, if you would like to ask questions in Spanish or interview one of the experts in Spanish, please contact me and we'll arrange that after the press conference is over.

We'll now open the floor to questions.

If I could ask you to introduce yourself and your organisation before posing your query, please go ahead in the front row.

[Other language spoken]

I am Antonio Brotto, journalist for FS Spanish news agency.

You mentioned that some commanders of Fias have been promoted.

After this this force was converted into diet.

[Other language spoken]

Also people con decorated and and that were thanked.

For for its work with Vice.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you so much for your question.

Yes, indeed.

One of the findings from our investigations into this new directorate that was created within the National Bolivarian Police in Venezuela, the Diet, is that indeed a **** number of those in leadership positions within this directorate.

[Other language spoken]

In fact, 9 out of these leadership positions, 9 out of 14 individuals had been previously members of the Special Action Forces, which as my colleague Francisco mentioned, we had identified in previous reports that had been the Special Action Forces had been involved in the Commission of serious international crimes and gross human rights violations.

Out of those nine that I just mentioned, in particular, three of them that had been identified in previous reports of the mission and and those are Jose Miguel Dominguez Ramirez, Carlos Alberto Calderon Chirinos and Ronnie Gonzalez Montecinos are individuals that previously were part of the.

Either the Special Action Forces or and or Sabine, which is the National Intelligence Service.

And in those posts the mission has reasonable grounds to believe that they were involved in gross human rights violations and and serious international crimes, including acts of torture and other forms of ill treatment.

Now these individuals in this new directorate, the Diet, have taken up important positions.

Jose Miguel Dominguez Ramirez has been the director, the director of this new directorate, the Diet.

Carlos Alberto Calderon Chirinos was formerly the deputy director of Diet and is currently the director, and Ronnie Gonzalez Montecinos is the chief of the Criminal Investigations Division of Diet.

That is why not only do we are we reporting about a continuity in terms of the chain of command between the Special Action Forces, the FIS and this new directorate of Strategic and tactical Actions, the Diet, but also that key individuals in state structures such as the Fi's Special Action Forces and the Sabine, the National Intelligence Service, have taken up important positions in this new directorate instead of what the mission had recommended that they would be investigated for their involvement in previous gross human rights violations and international crimes.

[Other language spoken]

We'll take another question anymore from the room.

We'll take one question online from Maria Alejandra.

If you could just identify what news agency you're working with.

[Other language spoken]

I wanted to ask the experts they've they've mentioned that they have identified serious international crimes and its perpetrators as miscellaneous just explained in more detail.

I was wondering, have you shared this information with the IC CS Office of the Prosecutor, given that they are carrying out an International Criminal investigation on Venezuela or with any other organisation that might take might be able to take legal actions under the universal jurisdiction as you had suggested in your first report?

[Other language spoken]

Thank you for your question.

The the the Mission has mentioned several times previously that the information, the information that we collect beat through the interviews that we conduct or documentary evidence provided, that the sources have given us authorisation to share this information with other jurisdictions and other organisations and in particular jurisdictions that respect due process.

The Mission is willing and pleased to share that information.

That includes, of course, International Criminal Court for their current investigations into the situation in Venezuela, as well as other jurisdictions that may be analysing these human rights violations and crimes under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

So we are willing to do that.

We are ready to do that and where we congratulate, in fact, initiatives under the principle of universal jurisdiction that attempt to promote accountability for the the crimes and violations that have been documented by the mission, including the current initiative of the Cling Foundation for Justice in Argentina, but others that may come up in the future.

And we of course, also are accompanying with great interest the developments in the investigation of the international, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

[Other language spoken]

We'll take another question online from Laurence Ciero from the Swiss News Agency.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you for taking my.

[Other language spoken]

Reports you were calling explicitly for the dismantling of fires and it's interesting to see that in this report you're just calling for reforms of that.

Does that mean that you don't believe anymore that the authorities?

Are going to be willing.

To to take that step and to dismantle that kind of unity of units within the police.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you for your question.

We believe that they must comply with human rights, international human rights standards.

And since what we've seen is that there's no prosecution and sanction of those most responsible of the crimes that we have been reporting in previous reports and we see a similar modus operandi and kind of like con decoration and change of name only we believe that of course dismantling would be an option.

But this is the minimal.

I mean, you must prosecute and sanction and investigate those that we have mentioned as with reasonable grounds to believe as involved in these crimes in our previous report.

Therefore, of course, our recommendation is basically the same, but to uplift and respect human rights standards and prosecute, because these are crimes under under Venezuelan criminal law.

I would just add that what our investigations show as well is that in, in certain contexts, as we have seen in Venezuela, disbanding or officially disbanding a certain structure such as the Special Action Forces doesn't always and doesn't necessarily solve the problem, right?

That's exactly what we've seen and that's exactly what what we are highlighting here is that an official disbanding of a certain structure actually meant that key individuals from that structure were transferred to another structure.

And we have seen as well that practises have also been replicated in this new structure.

Of course, this new structure was created only a little bit over a year ago, so we will need more time also to to investigate and that's why it's important to monitor the actions of this new force.

But we have already documented, for example, one case of a Union Leader who was arbitrarily detained and subjected to I'll treatment by this new directorate.

So as Francisco says, it is important to ensure accountability through investigation and prosecution of individuals that have been involved in these crimes.

But it is essential to ensure that practises are changed within these institutions and not just the disbanding of one structure to, for for for it to transform into another structure as has been the case here.

[Other language spoken]

We'll take one another question online from Regina Garcia.

[Other language spoken]

Thank you for the opportunity.

I I'm Virginia Garcia with Associate of Press.

I have a couple of questions.

You mentioned in in your remarks as well as in the report this shift from broad to more targeted repression over the past three years.

As you know, the opposition's primary election is just in a little over a month.

And I'm wondering, do you expect some of these strategies that you mentioned to to intensify over the next few weeks?

And also, as you know, electoral conditions are part of some of the broader negotiations involving Venezuela and other countries.

And I'm wondering if if you're concerned that some of this, I guess the part, not just the shift, but also the continuation of this targeted repression is, is perhaps being minimised in an effort to to move some of those negotiations along?

[Other language spoken]

Thank you also for your question.

What we have documented is indeed that some of the restrictions on civic and democratic space, such as limitations to the work of the media and to political parties and political nominees, has intensified even in the past in periods before elections.

And so based on what happened in the past, we could say that it is indeed to be expected.

In fact, some of these acts are we are, we are seeing already an intensification right now.

So for example, almost 300 radio stations were closed in the country in the period between 2003 and 2022.

Now out of this.

2022 was the year that registered a higher number of radio stations being closed.

As you know and has has already been mentioned, we have 3 nominees to primary elections of the from the, the unitary platform of the opposition parties that have been politically disqualified and one just recently, Maria Corina Machado.

So on the basis of what we've documented in the past in terms of limitations of the work of the media and of individual journalists, but also restrictions on political parties and political disqualification of individual nominees.

We have alarming signs in terms of what is currently and what can be in the coming months, the reality in terms of the civic and and democratic space of a, of a free of what should be a free civic and democratic space in Venezuela.

[Other language spoken]

We'd rather share with you what we've reported in the past.

But we will definitely be paying close attention to what will be happening in the coming months and in the coming year until the upcoming elections.

Yes, thank you for the question.

I think it's, it's really important and this is if you read the the whole report, what we're reporting here and what we're concluding is that there's like a two way repression or two components of the state apparatus that is oppressive and that has an effect on public and democratic civic space.

And, and this is the more targeted hardline, the core of our mandate that is explicit in our mandate that is more targeted.

And and as as Martin Patricia were mentioning, you see leaders in certain sections of society that are still being arbitrary detained and submitted to torture.

This sense, the sign, the signal to civil society that if you get involved, you suffer these consequences.

And this is built on what had happened before that was less targeted.

If you see this in addition to this more soft line, quote unquote, repression done through Konatel, done through the electoral National Council, done through the judiciary that they take over a political parties that even were part of these closer to the government parties like the Communist Party that now is intervened by the judiciary.

And you see that there is a restriction in political and democratic space, the disqualification of those opposition members that start to race in the polls like Miss Mattel, Corina Mattel, right.

And so this of course, is not the best atmosphere to have an election.

But as Marta was saying, we report and we will.

We have one last year of mandate and we'll be paying attention on exactly what happens to these modes of repression that we have seen and documented in this current report.

[Other language spoken]

Sorry, just to to say something more in regarding this last point.

I I think that this is is very important to to figure out how this action are clearly oriented at deterring critics of the opponent.

Indeed, they say they serve as a flagship or emblematic cases to silence and crush the will to speak freely.

Even if they were not, there are a number of action that appear to be perfectly combined, concerted using the political institutionality of the state.

If you remember, we mentioned the Ombudsman Office, the Controller and the National Council for Elections.

All these institutions and others of administrative levels put permanent administrative obstacles for the registration and for daily functioning of the NGOs and political parties and more.

The for example, the intervention of the government changing the board of directors of those institution is a is a clear demonstration of the direction of these measures.

If the states intervene in any step of civil society and political parties.

Daily life is very difficult to see a not worrying environment when we are experience a pre electoral time.

Thank you very much.

[Other language spoken]

OK, we'll take one more question on line and then we'll come back, back to the room.

We have a Gabriella Sotomayor, please go ahead.

Yes, thank you for taking my question.

This is Gabriella Sotomayor, Proceso, Mexico.

[Other language spoken]

If may I first regarding all of you that you are saying about elections and everything, do you fear that Venezuela is heading towards a dictatorship or is it already de facto dictatorship?

I I just want to know that then do you think that the perpetrator, perpetrators of this serious violations of human rights yet that you are mentioning that you are describing, do you think that the perpetrators are acting with a Nicolas Maduro consent?

And then another question on Maria Corina Machado.

Did you contact her?

Are you, do you fear for her life or her security because you know, Nicolas Maduro said that she can't run for elections and and the people support her a lot.

So what are your observations on this?

And lastly, if by any chance you can give a message in Spanish later with the main findings because it's important to to listen to you in Spanish.

[Other language spoken]

We highlighted in the in our report several attacks on.

On the civic and democratic space in Venezuela, we will not comment on the political nature of the current government.

That is not our mandate.

Our mandate is to document as we've done, specific human rights violations and this includes violations to freedom of expression, freedom of association, and also the rights to participate in public affairs, which includes the so-called political rights.

And and that's in that framework that we've analysed as well how or to what extent the rights to participate in political life are being respected or not.

And that is why we are are documenting cases of interference and arbitrary employment of political disqualifications, for example.

But what we are analysing is really how those fundamental freedoms and rights are being respected in the country rather than going into a political assessment of of the current government, which is beyond the scope of our mandate.

In terms of the crimes and violations that the mission has documented, as you know very well, some of the crimes and violations that we've documented in the past and we've documented at length the involvement of higher levels of within the state in terms of their knowledge and contribution to the Commission of those crimes.

That has.

That has been documented extensively in our past reports.

And this refers primarily to the violations and international crimes that we've documented in our report 2020 and then elaborated further in the following reports in 2021 and 2022, which correspond to the period in which we are saying now that the more violent tactics or hardline tactics were used by the state to repress dissidents and criticism and opposition to the government.

So in relation to those crimes that we've documented in the past, I think that's quite clearly established from our view and on the basis of reasonable grounds to believe that there were there was knowledge and contribution from higher levels of the of the government and other state institutions.

Now, in terms of certain individuals with public profiles, such as Maria Corina Machado, but others as well, fearing for their lives and their security.

We have also noted throughout our investigations that on the one hand, those that stay in the country and that are perceived or are in fact opponents to the government are subject to a number of attacks.

Sometimes we're talking about physical attacks with documented cases of arbitrary detentions of both members of the political opposition parties, but prominent members of civil society more in general.

So human rights defenders, people who are criticising the the, the policies and decisions of of the government or sometimes omissions of the government.

We've documented several types of attacks on their integrity, their liberty, and also on freedom of expression and freedom of participation in political and public affairs.

And we've noted that some of these individuals have had to leave the country precisely because of their fear for their lives and for reasons of insecurity.

And this again includes both members of political parties, but also individuals that have simply done their work as human rights defenders, including individuals that work on, as Patricia mentioned before, on sexually reproductive rights that go against the line of the government and therefore start being harassed, start being followed, are subject to discrediting, stigmatising, defamatory messages in public, media and other for that are used by state officials.

And so there is clearly a ****** on integrity and right to security of these individuals and that's why many of them do leave the country and and the receive protection based on their well founded fears of political persecution.

So yes, I think that is a concern for for many individuals who are still in the country and that has led many of others to leave the country in the in in the past years.

And currently still I'll hand over to one of my colleagues for a summary.

If I understood you'd like that to be done now a summary in Spanish of the findings, Gabriela.

Now, OK, just a very short and in reference to a a portion of the question, the FFM is not interested and it's not able also because of it's out of our mandate to qualify the the nature of the political regime.

Perhaps you can look to this in some political science manuals, but we envision that if things continue to happen in this way and it for example, we know because some inhabilitations are hidden now, but will be announced at the time of the Electoral Act or more will be announced when the person running for election win.

These are not a good and fair condition to a an electoral competition.

So right now we have to to focus in, for example, remember that two candidates are not able to to run for this election, that is Capri and Freddie Superlano and one person nominee as Maria Corina Machado is also with and not able to to run because of the announces of the camera electoral.

But it's very important to remember that there are many, many peoples of lower levels, but not all the inhabilitations are known by the public, less not all the inhabilitations are publicly in a formal newsletter or other source, official source from the government.

I don't know in in Spanish as he asked just it's OK.

[Other language spoken]

We'll go back to FA in the in the front.

Thank you very much.

I think this report mentions a less government leaders than previous, previous documents, but one O 1 which is still mentioned is Diosdado Cabello.

Can you elaborate on, on his role silence in dysent?

I think it's an example of the soft measures that that you you are calling in this report.

But is he also behind harder measures?

[Other language spoken]

Thank you for for your question.

We have indeed in in this report focused as we said in the beginning, mostly on attacks on civic and democratic space in Venezuela, which complement, let's say existing parallel with other harsher forms of repression that we've documented at length before and to which we provide an update in in this report.

Now, in terms of the involvement of state officials and state institutions in what we've we're documenting in this report as attacks on civic and democratic space, we highlight in several areas of the report how statements and particularly defamatory or disqualifying stigmatising statements by state officials, including Diosado Cabello, who as you know, is a member of the National Assembly and it's the vice president of the ruling party in Venezuela.

The the fact that individuals like him use state media, but also other platforms, including the National Assembly itself to, to, to make this, this type of statements that I just mentioned.

And, and the the seriousness of this type of statements is also linked to what you mentioned, which is the fact that we've documented previously that certain of these individuals have in particular cases where, for example, certain individuals were arbitrarily arrested, they have made also statements, for example, in relation to their innocence.

So by even before the courts had a chance to analyse the cases, they were already staying saying also in state media and in their public platforms that these individuals were guilty.

And usually the type of accusations made are that they are guilty of terrorism, of conspiracy, of being traitors to to the nation.

And all of this has, as we found an impact, of course, on the ability of of these individuals to really carry out their work, be it as human rights defenders, as journalists, or as members of political parties.

Because on the one hand, it impacts the the image, of course, that large parts of the population have of these individuals, but also carries that ****** that someone like him accusing someone of being a traitor or being a terrorist because they are in contact with foreign governments or receiving funding from foreign government, carries the ****** that there will be indeed judicial proceedings against that person, as has happened in the past.

So the importance, the relevance and the alarming nature of this type of statements and expressions by individuals with that level of power is because it it has happened in the past that when they've identified someone in these terms, traitor terrorists or involved in conspiracies against the government as resulted in in detentions and in sometimes prolonged pretrial periods and and in judicial proceedings where we've documented that due process was not respected.

[Other language spoken]

We'll go back to follow up from Maria Alejandra from El Nacional.

Thank you very much.

Yes, I, I wanted to touch upon the, the, the banning that our experts referred on the banning of running to in elections.

Have have you been able to speak to the Venezuelan authorities with regard with regards to the legality of these bannings of candidates that you pointed out in the report and and right now in the press conference?

And then I had a second question and it's with regards with the collaborators of the political parties in the different cities.

When candidates go to events and and rallies around the the country, they have those that have helped them are later on harassed or their shops are being closed or they are even detained.

And I was wondering if you had been able to document any of these cases, if you had testimonies or informations in this regard?

Thank you very much.

[Other language spoken]

Responding to your first question, whether we've been able to discuss with authorities and if I understood well, you mentioned specifically on the issue of political disqualifications.

Unfortunately, we haven't been able to discuss any of the issues that we've documented with representatives of the Venezuelan state and several state institutions that we mentioned in our report.

And the reason for that is that the Venezuelan state has chosen not to respond to any of our attempts to engage in dialogue or requests for information for specific information.

That is unfortunate.

And that is something that we would want to be different in the future so that we can also include information, official information as well as their point of view in our in our reports.

We have documented several instances in which individuals that are that, that that are helping or working together in some way with the main individuals targeted end up suffering also several types of of attacks or limitations on their capacity to do their work.

So I think you also in your question you made reference specifically also to political candidates.

So I'll focus on that as well and my answer.

And we have documented how in several instances, when political candidates were doing their work throughout the country and going to public meetings in different parts of the country, they were faced with, for example, hotels where they were staying at being being actually closed either the following day or even before they were able to stay there.

Also several checkpoints during their route to to the places where they were having these public gatherings and all of this hampering their capacity to actually do the their work.

But more than that, we've also documented cases where individuals that are sometimes the drivers, I mean relatives as well, but sometimes drivers, etcetera, of the individuals that are seen as the opponents to the government and who are the principal targets also being arbitrarily arrested, also spending long periods in pretrial detention and and so suffering also in that way because of being associated with the principal targets of the repression.

[Other language spoken]

I would just add that it will that Martha has said that you can find all that analysis in in Chapter 3 of our longer report.

But also that some of the interference that we see by the Telecommunications National Telecommunications Commission is by censorship and that some people cannot be interviewed and some words cannot be said.

And as soon as they interview or interact with these people, they risk the continuity of this radio or newspaper, Internet newspaper.

So there is a different modes of harassment that follow when you breach these censorship rules.

[Other language spoken]

We'll take one last question from Carmen Lucia and from El Tempio in Colombia.

Yeah, thank you very much for taking my question and for this briefing, of course.

I just wanted to know if we can have a copy of your opening remarks, please.

[Other language spoken]

Yes, that's possible.

And also you have, of course, the press release and our reports, which I strongly encourage you to read the short reports in both languages, English and Spanish, which I think give you a lot of information, very complete information for your reporting.

[Other language spoken]

Would any of the experts like to make any final comments before we close?

[Other language spoken]

All right.

Well, that brings us to the end of this press conference today.

The report main report is online already and the two detailed reports will be two additional detailed reports will be online shortly.

[Other language spoken]

And if you need them, just please write to this and we'll get them to you.

[Other language spoken]

HRC Press conference: FFM on Venezuela - 20 September 2023 Continuity